最近，有三位专家对金融监管问题提出了独特看法，认为本次金融危机不是因缺乏监管引起的，更不是因监管太死引起的，而是在监管政策的制订、执行过程中，存在各种各样的问题直接影响了监管效果引起的。这些看法对中国金融监管改革有什么参考意义，值得关注。

recently,There are three experts in financial supervision problems puts forward the unique view,That the financial crisis is not for lack of supervision of the cause,More not by supervision is caused by the death,But in the formulation of regulatory policy/During the execution of the,Exist various problems directly affect the regulatory effect of the cause.These views on China's financial regulatory reform have what reference meaning,Worth attention.

　　⊙刘骏

⊙ LiuJun

　　在过去的十年中，中国的金融市场发展迅速。现在，在美国的市场上能看到的金融产品在中国大部分都能找到。因此，中国的金融监管问题一直是比较热门的话题。有呼吁放开的，也有强调监管的。从金融市场的历史经验看，越是市场发展迅速、新产品层出不穷，监管越应该被重视而不是简单地放松。

In the past ten years,The financial markets in China developed rapidly.now,In the United States market can see financial products in China most can find.therefore,China's financial supervision problem has been hot topic.Have called for the release,Also have emphasized the supervision.From the financial market's historical experience to look at,The more rapid development of the market/New product emerge in endlessly,The supervision should be pay attention to and not simply relax.

　　最近，有三位在宏观金融和监管领域素有见解的专家巴斯（JAMES BARTH）、卡皮里奥（GERARD CAPRIO JR）和勒凡（ROSS LEVINE）写了一本书《金融监管者：让他们为我们更好地工作》。这是在2012年“后金融危机时代”三位专家根据他们对金融监管者在危机发生前后的表现所做的观察与研究写成的新著。其中的一些见解非常独特。

recently,There are three in the macro financial and regulatory field known as the views of experts buss(JAMES BARTH)/Okapi Rio(GERARD CAPRIO JR)And le all(ROSS LEVINE)Wrote a book[Financial regulators:Let them work better for us].It was in 2012"After the financial crisis era"The three experts based on their financial regulators in the crisis before and after the performance observation and research new written.Some of these ideas is very unique.

　　之所以这么说，是因为它是专门就金融监管，尤其是现代金融监管体系为话题的研究成果。作者从监管本身的特点到具体监管者在危机中的表现，从美国的监管到其他出现危机国家的监管，以及对监管政策和效果的历史考察，直至“后危机时代”监管体系的改革等方面的问题，都有非常独到分析。

By saying that,Because it is specially the financial supervision,Especially in modern financial supervision system for topic research results.Based on the characteristics of the regulation itself to specific regulators in the performance of crisis,The supervision from the United States to other crisis supervision of the country,As well as to the supervision policy and the effect the investigation to the history of,until"Crisis era after"The reform of the supervision system, etc,There are very original analysis.

　　其中一个比较值得中国金融监管者思考的问题是：这次危机或者很多历史上的金融危机，不是因为缺乏监管引起的，更不是因为监管太死引起的，而是在监管政策的制订、执行过程中存在各种各样的问题直接影响了监管的效果引起的。这对于我们今天探讨改革中的中国金融市场监管有着十分重要的参考意义。

One of the more worthy of China's financial regulators think the problem is:The crisis or a lot of history of financial crisis,Not because of the lack of supervision of the cause,Not because more supervision is caused by the death,But in the formulation of regulatory policy/During the execution of the existing various problems directly affect the effect of the regulation of the cause.This for us today to explore the reform of China's financial market regulation has very important reference significance.

　　这里，我们就从涉及监管的几个基本方面来探讨作者提出的一些观点，以及对中国金融市场监管可能带来的借鉴与启示。

here,We will in supervision from several basic aspects to explore the author put forward some views,And to China's financial market regulation may bring reference and enlightenment.

　　金融监管的三种基本模式 Financial supervision of the three basic mode

　　模式决定态度，态度决定手段，手段最终影响被监管机构和市场的行为。金融监管有三种基本模式。它们是：完全自由市场化，公共利益导向和私有部门利益导向。

Mode decision attitude,Attitude means,Method final influenced by regulators and market behavior.There are three basic financial supervision mode.They are:Completely free market,Public interest orientation and the private sector interest orientation.

　　在完全自由市场化的模式下，政府对金融市场“听之任之”，也就是说，政府不应该对金融机构有所干涉，不需要为他们提供存款保险，或者是限制资本充足率等。这个模式在现实中为不少国家所采纳，比较有代表性的就是美国。前联储主席格林斯潘、财政部长鲁宾和总统经济顾问之一的萨默斯都持这样的观点。

In completely free market mode,The government on the financial market"Laissez faire",That is,The government should not to financial institutions have interference,Don't need to offer them deposit insurance,Or was the limitation of the capital adequacy ratio, etc.This mode in reality for many countries have adopted,Some representative is the United States.Former fed chairman Alan greenspan/Finance minister rubin and one of the President's economic advisers Mr Summers are hold such a view.

　　于是，当前美国商品期货交易委员会主席伯恩女士在危机前提出，需要对某些金融衍生物进行政府监管和干预的时，这三人提出了强烈的反对，使得加强监管的提案流产，最终正是因为这些衍生物成为众多大型投资银行资本结构中的“定时炸弹”，导致美国纳税人为之支付大量的成本。

so,The current the commodity futures trading commission chairman Berne lady made before the crisis,Need for some financial derivatives on government regulation and intervention of,This three puts forward the strong opposition,That strengthening the supervision of proposal abortion,Finally it is precisely because these derivatives become large investment Banks in the capital structure"Time bomb",Led to the American taxpayer to pay a lot of cost.

　　完全自由市场化需要两个必要条件：法律和市场的完美保障。其中“完美”的含义就是，花费成本最小。例如，对于法律规定的金融协议的执行有保障，公司许诺给债券投资人的利息和成本支付可以很轻易地完成，没有诉讼费用，时间费用等成本掺杂其中；而市场“完美化”则更理想，被投资的企业对投资人信息完全公开，企业运行如何，企业有否猫腻，投资人一清二楚。很显然，这两个条件就算在发达国家的美国也不完全具备，更不用提制度亟待发展完善的国家了。

Completely free market need two necessary conditions:Law and market perfect security.the"perfect"Meaning is,Minimum costs.For example,For the law of financial execution of the agreement is guaranteed,The company promised to bond investor interest and cost payment can easily finish,No litigation costs,Time expenses cost doping among them;And market"The beautification"Is more ideal,The invested enterprise information to investors completely open,Enterprise operation how to,The enterprise is involved in any issue,Investors as clear as day.obviously,The two conditions even if in the developed countries the United States and not have,Not to mention system development to improve the country.

　　公共利益导向的模式以及私有部门利益导向的模式有个共同前提，就是承认市场的不完美，以及由于这种不完美所带来的经济外部化问题，都需要有市场以外的力量介入。

Public interest guidance mode and private sector interest guidance mode have a common premise,Is admitted that the market is not perfect,And because of this is not perfect brought about by the economic externalizing problem,All need to have the power of the outside market intervention.

　　公共利益导向的拥护者认为这一力量的最好代表就是政府，因为政府拥有最好的信息来源、最优秀的人才来处理和防范市场的失衡。而私有部门利益导向的拥护者则认为虽然政府可以使用监管来完善市场失灵的地方，但是政府本身也有缺失之处，尤其是作为政府中的个人利益往往凌驾于公共利益之上，造成大量的政府公共资源的浪费。

Public interest oriented proponents argue that this power is the best representative government,Because the government has the best source of information/The most excellent talents to handle and prevent market imbalance.And the private sector interest orientation advocates argue that although the government can use supervision to perfect the market failure place,But the government is also missing place,Especially as the government of personal interests often superior to the public interests,Caused a lot of government public waste of resources.

　　其实在这次的金融危机中，刚好有这么两个金融产品恰恰体现了政府干预和市场自发的对风险的防范，这两种干预又恰恰都不算成功，那么这揭示了什么呢？

In fact in the financial crisis,Just have so two financial products just reflects the government intervention and market spontaneous of risk prevention,These two kinds of intervention also exactly is not successful,It reveals the what?

　　第一，政府参与的对风险防范的就是政府隐形担保的“两房”。两房因为其历史的渊源和国会给予的住房拥有率等政策性目标，以及国会给予的优惠照顾的资本杠杆率，使得两房普遍被认为含有政府的担保。

The first,The government participation to risk prevention is the government stealth guarantee"Two room".Two room because its historical origin and congress to give the housing ownership etc policy goals,And congress to give preferential treatment for capital leverage ratio,The two room is generally think that contains the government's guarantee.

　　当然事后，美国政府也的确是将两房公开国有化了。但是之前政府的这种隐形担保，虽然起到了促进房地产市场的作用，也帮助两房完成了提高住房拥有率的政策性指标，却也给两房制造了“道德风险”，并且在房地产市场中将这种道德风险通过房地产贷款证券化的过程传输到上游的房地产贷款提供者，使整个体系的风险大幅度增加。

Of course after,The United States government also is really two room open nationalised.But before the government's this kind of invisible guarantee,Although rose to promote the role of the real estate market,Also help the two room completed improve housing ownership policy index,But also to the two room made"Moral risk",And in the real estate market will be the moral risk through the real estate loan securitization process transmission to the upstream of the real estate loan providers,Make the whole system greatly increases the risk.

　　这样的一个政策，在最初，监管者就忽略了其可能带来的道德风险；在系统道德风险增加的过程中，比如部分地区房地产贷款的标准大幅度下降，甚至很多贷款机构为了争夺市场份额，恶性竞争，使很多完全不符合借款条件的买房者也轻易借到了贷款的情况下，监管者理应对放贷机构做出政策上的限制措施，可是他们并没有；监管者对两房的资本状况，尤其是杠杆率过高的状况，也没有采取必要的措施；监管者对房地产贷款证券过于依赖信用机构评级也没有做出适时合理的评估和对市场的提醒。

Such a policy,In the first,Regulators will ignore its may bring moral risk;In the system the moral risk in the process of increase,Such as part of the regional real estate loan standard decimated,Even a lot of lending institutions in order to fight for market share,Vicious competition,Make a lot of completely is not in conformity with the loan conditions easily also house buyers borrowed loans under the situation,Regulators should to lenders to make policy restrictions,But they did not;Regulators to two room capital status,Especially the leverage ratio high status,Also does not have to take the necessary measures;Regulators on real estate loan securities reliance on credit rating agency nor make timely and reasonable evaluation on the market to remind.

　　第二，是市场针对房地产抵押证券可能出现的违约风险所创造的金融产品，信用违约掉期（CDS）。这种产品类似保险，一旦相关证券出现信用违约，那么信用违约掉期就可以为持有者提供保险补偿。可是和保险不同的是，这样的产品并不需要被保险物，也就是说，不同于传统意义上的保险，受保人必须有需要保险的对象存在，比如汽车，房屋等，这种信用掉期，购买人可以不持有所投保的证券。

The second,Is the market for real estate mortgage securities possible risk of default created financial products,Credit default swaps(CDS).This product similar insurance,Once the relevant securities appear credit default,So credit default swaps can provide insurance compensation for holders.But and insurance is different,This product does not need to be insurance object,That is,Different from the traditional sense of insurance,Insured persons must have need insurance object exists,Such as car,houses,This credit swap,Purchaser can not hold for the securities.

　　用罗杰·鲁文斯坦在《华尔街末日》一书中的话来说就是，“你可以为你的邻居家购买火灾险，这样一来，如果邻居家着火了，你也可以获得赔偿”。这样的产品的存在同样给房地产贷款放款机构和证券发行机构都提供了道德风险，监管者并没有对这二者加强监管；监管者还忽略了对出售信用违约掉期的金融机构的监管，最终导致了资本不足，风险集中，过分依赖评级机构等一系列风险爆发。

With Roger achieved in Stamford[The end of the Wall Street]It is a book of words,"You can for your neighbor's the purchase of fire insurance,so,If the neighbor's on fire,You can also win compensation".The existence of such products to the same real estate loan lending institutions and securities issue institutions provide the moral risk,Regulators and not for the two to strengthen supervision;Regulators also ignore to sell credit default swaps the supervision of the financial institutions,Eventually led to the lack of capital,Risk concentration,Depend on the rating agencies and a series of outbreaks of risk.

　　这两个例子，既说明了市场想仅仅依靠自己可以解决市场失灵的问题是不可能的，也反映出政府作为监管者在解决问题上也并不那么足以我们公众给予信赖。由此可见，对于监管模式的选择，应该是混合的，复杂的过程，并不是只选择单一的模式就可以取得成效。

These two examples,Which means the market want to just depend on yourself can solve the problem of market failure is not possible,Also reflects the government as regulators at problem solving is not so enough to give us the public trust.Thus it can be seen,For the regulatory model selection,Should be mixed,Complex process,And not only choose single model can obtain the result.

　　对这个问题的认识，我们甚至应该建立这样的一种思维，那就是：即使是选择了正确的监管模式，监管过程的本身仍然因为存在这样或者那样的困境而导致效果的不明显，甚至监管本身也有可能促成了危机的爆发，这使我们不得不关注监管以及监管者的激励机制，即是什么可以促使他们更好的实施监管的问题。

To the awareness of the problem,We even should establish such a kind of thinking,That is:Even if is to choose the correct supervision mode,Supervision process itself still because of the existence of one sort or another dilemma and cause effect is not obvious,Even supervision itself also may have led to the outbreak of the crisis,This makes us have to pay attention to supervision and regulators incentive mechanism,Is what can make them better implement supervision problems.

　　监管的激励机制 Supervision of incentive mechanism

　　激励机制，对于任何工作的开展都有至关重要的意义，这不局限于金融监管。本书的三位作者从一般公司治理中股东利益经常不能被保障的原因出发，详细地阐述了激励机制的不合理是如何导致股东作为公司法律意义上的所有者却往往最不能得到利益的保障。

Incentive mechanism,For any work development have very important significance,It's not limited financial supervision.The book three authors in corporate governance from the general shareholders often cannot be guaranteed causes on,The incentive mechanism in detail the unreasonable is how to lead to shareholders as the company legal sense of owners are often the most can't get interests security.

　　他们然后对金融系统中从风险评估模型，到信用评级机构，投资银行，商业银行，证券和交易委员会，美联储到两房所存在的激励机制出发，探究了为什么众多参与者对风险可以忽视，甚至不愿意接受的原因。这其中既存在了对前面提到的模式选择的问题（比如美联储的持续低利率政策等），更多是激励机制出了问题（比如商业银行遵循投资银行的激励机制）。

They then for the financial system from risk assessment model,To credit rating agencies,Investment bank,Commercial Banks,Securities and exchange commission,The federal reserve to two rooms are based on incentive mechanism,To explore why many participants to the risk can be ignored,Don't even willing to accept reason.Which is the existence of the above mentioned model for the problem of choice(Such as the fed's continued low interest rate policy, etc),More incentive mechanism is out of the question(Such as commercial Banks follow the investment bank's incentive mechanism).

　　更有意义的是，他们在谈到“后危机时代”美国出台的一些新的监管机构从根本上并没有摆脱危机前的其他监管机构在激励机制上的通病，因此并不认为“后危机时代”的这些新的监管机构会比危机前的监管机构更有效。这恰恰给中国正在探索中的金融监管完善提供了拥有实际意义的现实参照和建议。

More significant is,They are talking about"Crisis era after"The United States on the introduction of the new regulators fundamentally and not out of the crisis before the other regulators in the incentive mechanism of common fault,So don't think"Crisis era after"These new regulators than before the crisis regulators more effective.This just to China is exploring in financial regulation provides perfect have meaningful realistic reference and Suggestions.

　　以中国的客观情况来说明，中国目前仍是一个以商业银行为主导的资本市场模式，以存款为主要的资本融资方式。这可以说是中国的一个优势，因为传统意义上的银行存款要比发行股票或者债券更便宜，方便也稳定。反观投资银行，因为其资金来源不是储蓄，而主要是交易利润收入和承销业务收入，因此资本结构并不稳定，尤其是当交易无法顺利开展的时候，投资银行将有可能资不抵债。

To China's objective conditions to illustrate,China is still a commercial Banks as the leading capital market model,To account for the main capital financing mode.This can be said to be China's an advantage,Because the traditional bank deposits than the issuance of stocks or bonds cheaper,Convenience and stable.Investment Banks in,Because of its source of fund is not savings,And mainly trading profit income and the underwriting business income,Thus, the capital structure is not stable,Especially when trading cannot smoothly carry out the time,Investment Banks will likely insolvency.

　　举个简单例子，一家投资银行将其从市场上购买的证券可以重新打包，使其成为比较适应市场需求的金融产品，既可以出售给别的投资者，也可以作为交易的抵押物（比如掉期）。这个时候，如果突然因为市场形势的变化，同一类型的证券在市场上不再受欢迎甚至是市场冻结了，该投资银行的资产负债表上的资产价值就会大大缩水。根据会计准则按照市场化计算通报价值的情况下，该公司的净资产很有可能出现大大的亏损甚至是为负引发倒闭。因此，在激励机制中，投资银行家们是倾向于承担高风险所带来的高收益，可是传统商业银行则不然。

Give a simple example,An investment bank from the market to buy securities can repack,Make it a comparison to adapt to the market demand of financial products,Can be sold to other investors,Also can be used as the mortgaged property transactions(Such as swap).This time,If suddenly because the market situation changes,The same type of securities in the market no longer popular even market froze,The investment bank's balance sheet on the value of the assets will be greatly shrink.According to the accounting standards according to the market value calculated under the condition of the report,The company's net assets is likely to appear big losses even for negative cause failure.therefore,In the incentive mechanism,Investment bankers are tend to assume high risk brought about by the high yield,But the traditional commercial bank is different.

　　商业银行的融资渠道中大部分是居民和商业储蓄，相对来说较为稳定，不会面临大面积的提取造成银行流动性的问题。理论上，商业银行的经营应该更为保守，因为不需要为高风险支付高的成本，因此也就不需要高收益的保障。可是一旦将投资银行的激励机制引入商业银行，尤其是按照中间费用甚至是某些交易费用或者交易量来给予报酬，那么势必造成商业银行内部开始追逐高收益下的高风险的危险趋势。

Commercial bank's financing channel is most of the residents and commercial savings,Relatively stable,Not face the extraction of large area caused by bank liquidity problems.In theory,Commercial bank management should be more conservative,Because it does not need to pay for the high risk high cost,Therefore, don't need high yield of security.But once the investment bank's incentive mechanism in commercial Banks,Especially, in accordance with the intermediate cost and even some transaction cost or volume to give compensation,So it will be bound to cause the commercial Banks internal began to chase high yield of high-risk dangerous trend.

　　这对于商业银行内部的员工来说未必是坏事，因为他们的收入可以相应提高，可是对于为他们提供资金的广大商业和居民储蓄者来说，就存在一定的危险性。在美国有联邦储蓄保险公司为一定数额的储蓄提供保险，可是在中国并没有这样的保险制度。

This to commercial Banks for internal staff is not necessarily a bad thing,For their income can increase,But they provide funds for the business and residents for savers,There is a certain risk.In the United States have the federal deposit insurance company for a certain amount of savings provide insurance,But in China and there is no such insurance system.

　　即使建立了类似的保险制度和保险机构，从一方面说，监管者确保了储蓄的一定安全性，也降低了商业银行出现挤兑的可能性，对于降低系统风险有很重要的意义；可另一方面，保险制度也提高了商业银行本身对风险的承受能力，增加了其道德风险。因此，在建立这个储蓄保险机构的同时，这个机构同时必须承担监管者的义务监督商业银行。

Even if a similar insurance system and insurance institutions,From say on one hand,Regulators to ensure that the savings of a certain security,Also reduces the commercial Banks in the possibility of a run on a bank,For reducing the risk of system has very important significance;On the other hand,Insurance system and improve the commercial bank itself to the risk to bear ability,Increase the moral risk.therefore,In establishing the deposit insurance institutions at the same time,The agency also must bear the obligation of regulators supervision and commercial Banks.

　　然而，问题到这里还没有结束，有了这样的监管机构和制度，并不代表这样的机构和制度一定站在我们广大纳税人的同一侧。很多在监管机构中的具体监管人员和金融机构保持着千丝万缕的联系甚至是存在利益关系。这一点在这本书中被数次提及并强调甚至在作者提出的理想监管方案中也很大程度上依据了对这种利益关系的特别关注。

however,Problem here is not over yet,This regulators and system,Doesn't mean such institutions and will definitely stand on the same side of us taxpayers.Many in the regulators in the specific supervision personnel and financial institutions to keep the connection of countless ties even exist the interest relationship.This point in this book is mentioned several times and to emphasize even in the author puts forward ideal regulation scheme is largely based on the relationship between the interests of particular concern.

　　前面提到的三种监管模式中的私有部门利益导向这种观点就认为，政府很多时候并不为公共的最大利益服务。很多在监管部门中工作的人员因为专业和技能相近的关系，和被监管机构的管理者经常会打交道；这些人往往离开监管机构之后马上加入了金融机构，也有很多在监管机构中的人员之前就在金融机构工作过，这在美国和中国都屡见不鲜，这样的一个现状在书中被形象的用“旋转门”来形容。

Of the above mentioned three supervision mode of private sector interest guide this view will think,The government is not a lot of time for the best interest of the public service.Many in the supervision department of the work of the staff for professional and skills of close relationship,And regulators managers often deal with;These people are often left regulators soon after joined the financial institutions,Also have a lot of in the supervision institutions of personnel before they worked in financial institutions,This in the United States and China are common occurance,Such a situation in the book is the image with"Revolving door"To describe.

　　于是这里存在了这么一个悖论：如果一个监管者不了解金融机构本身，那他又怎么可以有效地监管呢；可是他如果了解金融机构，那么他往往在这样的金融机构里工作过或者熟悉其中的人和事，那他可能存在比较大的利益关联。这就是为什么美国存在储蓄保险公司扮演监管者的角色，却依然无法在危机爆发之前对出现问题的商业银行采取及时措施的原因之一了。

So there exist such a paradox:If a regulators don't understand financial institutions themselves,He how can effectively supervision;But if he know that financial institutions,So he is often in such work in the financial institutions or familiar with the people and things,That he may exist larger interests correlation.This is why the United States in a savings insurance company play the role of the regulators,But still can't in the crisis of problems before the commercial Banks to take timely measures of one of the reasons.

　　原因显然不能简单归结为银行的问题没有暴露，如果一个监管者发现该商业银行表外的业务越来越多，银行融资渠道中的储蓄大幅度下降，而取而代之的是越来越多的短期商业票据，银行发行的债券，这个监管者一旦提出质疑和采取限制性措施，将有可能同时面临来自被监管银行的高层和来自监管机构内部高层的挑战甚至是威胁，试问，该监管者又如何挑战这样的权威呢？

Cause obviously can not simply due to the bank no exposure,If a regulators found that the commercial bank's off-balance sheet business more and more,Bank financing channels of savings decimated,And instead more and more short-term commercial paper,Bank bonds,The regulators once questioned and take restrictive measures,There will be may also face from regulatory bank officials and regulators from internal high-level challenge even threatening,ask,The regulators and how to challenge the authority of this?

　　激励机制对监管在更宏观的层面所造成的影响有可能更为巨大。欧元区的现状就是在于当初在创建欧元区的时候，一个重要的前提假设在现实中并没有完全实现，那就是：没有政治因素的干扰。

Incentive mechanism for regulatory in more macroscopic level the impact of possible more great.The present situation of the euro area lies in the euro area was created when,An important premise hypothesis in reality has not been completely realized,That is:Without the interference of political factors.

　　欧元区统一了货币，也意味着各参与国失去了独立货币政策的权力，可是以控制通货膨胀为核心的货币和以政府预算和税收为核心的财政政策的对一国经济的相辅相成却要求要么财政政策得到相应的统一，要么货币政策仍然得以保留在各国政府手里。这样一来，在出现货币或者财政危机的时候，该国政府至少可以从另一方面对危机进行协调。

The eurozone unified currency,Also means that all participants lost the power of independent monetary policy,But to control inflation as the core currency and the government budget and tax as the core of the fiscal policy of one country economy supplement each other but requirements or fiscal policy to get corresponding unity,Either monetary policy is still preserved in governments hand.so,In case of money or financial crisis,The government can at least on the other hand coordinate to the crisis.

　　可是欧元区的目前政策却使该国政府只保留了“一条手臂”，在危机中除了财政政策并无其他方法，这难免受到政治的因素干扰受到抵制。激励机制的矛盾很快就体现在了该国对欧元区体系的利益和政府在本国人民前的利益并不一致，最后导致了该国政府面临要么执行紧缩财政政策而得罪本国人民导致下台，或者因为无法保证欧元区为了巩固货币提出的苛刻条件最后退出欧元区造成本国经济崩溃同样也可能下台这样的进退维谷的困境。

But the euro area's current policy will make the government withheld only"A arm",In a crisis in addition to fiscal policy and no other method,It is inevitable to be affected by political factors interference boycott.The incentive mechanism of contradiction quickly reflected in the country to the euro zone system in their interests and the government of the people's interests before is not uniform,Finally lead to the country's government faces execution or tight fiscal policy and have sinned against their own people lead to step down,Or because cannot assure the euro area, in order to consolidate its currency proposed severe condition finally quit the eurozone country caused by economic collapse also may step down such awkward predicament.

　　作者单位：加拿大联邦住房金融公司

The author unit:The Canadian federal housing finance company