（五）金融抑制 金融约束和金融干预 一个新的针对初期发展阶段证据的理论解释

(five)Financial inhibition financial constraints and financial intervention for a new early development stage of evidence theory to explain

　　金融抑制、金融约束和金融干预？

Financial repression/Financial constraints and financial intervention?

　　一个新的针对初期发展阶段证据的理论解释

A new according to the initial stage of development of the evidence theory to explain

　　张春、王一江

ZhangChun/WangYiJiang

　　摘要：在许多国家，政府采用政策性贷款以及直接管制的方式来保证银行的贷款利率低于正常的市场出清水平。这就是在大部分文献中都可以见到的“金融抑制”。发展过程中的政策制定都受到此观点的显著影响。本文中，我们提出了一种关于“金融干预”的理论，它会同时带来社会收益和社会成本。我们认为一种低水平的贷款利率可以提高效率，因为这可以减少社会有效投资项目的投入要素的逆向选择问题。比如，在投入要素是企业家能力(管理水平)的时候就会产生的逆向选择。高能力和低能力的管理者混同在一起，银行并不能把他们区分开来。低能力的管理者如果管理着具有较高破产风险的项目就会促使银行收取更高的贷款利率以避免损失。而高的贷款利率降低了一个项目的收益，以至于对有高价值替代项目的高能力管理者来说，进行该项目就不再值得。政府管制的低贷款利率会吸引高能力的管理者来承担社会需要的新项目。政府干预的成本就是银行没有激励来监控企业，因为这些银行只有在政府的补贴下才可以达到盈亏平衡。这就导致了软预算约束以及道德风险问题。在发展的初期阶段，这种收益与成本的权衡促使对既定的行业实行金融干预。本文的理论与20世纪60年代以来韩国以及中国台湾的银行贷款与存款利率的实际情况相一致。

the:In many countries,The government the policy loans and direct control way to guarantee bank lending rates below the normal market clearing the level.This is the most literature can be seen"Financial repression".In the process of development policy is the view of the significant effect.In this paper,We put forward a kind of about"Financial intervention"theory,It will also bring social benefits and social cost.We think that a low level of loan interest rate can improve efficiency,Because it can reduce social effective investment projects in elements of the adverse selection problem.For example,In the input element is entrepreneur ability(Management level)Time can produce the adverse selection.High capacity and low ability of managers confusion together,Bank and can't tell them apart.Low ability of managers if management have a higher risk of bankruptcy programs can be prompted Banks charge higher interest rates of loans to avoid loss.But high loan interest rate by a project benefits,That has high value to replace the high capacity for project managers,The project will no longer worth.Government control of the low mortgage rates will attract high ability of managers to take social needs new project.The cost of government intervention is the bank has no incentive to monitor enterprise,Because the bank only in government subsidies that can achieve breakeven.This will lead to the soft budget constraint and moral hazard problem.In the early stages of development,The income and cost to weigh against established industry implement financial intervention.The theory and the 1960 s South Korea and China Taiwan bank loan and deposit interest rate of the actual situation of consistent.

　　关键词：金融抑制，政策性贷款，金融发展

keywords:Financial repression,Policy loans,Financial development

　　Financial Repression, Financial Restraint, or Financial Intervention?

Financial Repression, Financial Restraint, Or Financial Intervention?

　　A New Theoretical Interpretation of Evidence in Early Development

A New Theoretical Interpretation of Evidence in Early Development

　　Abstract：In many countries, governments use policy loans and direct regulation to keep banks lending interest rates below market clearing rates. This is predominantly viewed in the literature as “ financial repression ” . Policy making in development has been significantly influenced by this view. In this paper, we develop a theory of financial intervention that has both social benefits and costs. We argue that a low lending rate can improve efficiency by alleviating the adverse selection of an input to socially efficient investment projects. This happens when the input is, for example, entrepreneurial (managerial) talent. High and low ability managers are in the same pool and banks cannot distinguish between them. The high bankruptcy risk of projects managed by low ability manager' s forces banks to charge high lending rates to avoid losing money. The high lending rate reduces the payoff of a new project, possibly to the extent that it is not worthwhile for a high ability manager with high valued alternatives to participate. A government regulated low lending rate attracts high ability managers to undertake socially desirable new projects .The cost of government intervention is that banks have little incentive to monitor firms when they need government subsidies to break even. This leads to soft budget and moral hazard problems. The tradeoff favors financial intervention in targeted industries and in the early stages of development. The theory is consistent with the bank lending and deposit rates in South Korea and Taiwan since the1960s.

Abstract:In many countries, Governments use policy loans and direct regulation to keep Banks lending interest rates below market clearing rates. This is predominantly viewed in the literature as " Financial repression " . Policy making in development has been significantly influenced by this view. In this paper, We develop a theory of financial intervention that has both social benefits and costs. We argue that a low lending rate can improve efficiency by alleviating the adverse selection of an input to socially efficient investment projects. This happens when the input is, For example, entrepreneurial (managerial) Talent. High and low ability managers are in the same pool and Banks cannot distinguish between them. The High bankruptcy risk of projects managed by low ability manager 's forces Banks to charge High lending rates to avoid losing money. The High lending rate reduces the payoff of a new project, Possibly to the extent that it is not worthwhile for a high ability manager with high valued alternatives to participate. A government regulated low lending rate attracts high ability managers to undertake socially desirable new projects. The cost of government intervention is that Banks have little incentive to monitor firms when they need government subsidies to break even. This leads to soft budget and moral hazard problems. The tradeoff favors financial intervention in targeted industries anD in the early stages of development. The theory is consistent with the bank lending and deposit rates in South Korea and Taiwan since the1960s.

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